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Climate change is commonly cast as a significant governance challenge demanding national and 
international actions. Subsequently, political science research tends to focus on the policy and politics of 
nation-states, their domestic institutions, and/or their interplay in international venues. However, 
thousands of industrial facilities and hundreds of subnational US governments are active in American 
climate risk governance. Therefore, we argue that more research should attend to climate governance’s 
subnational policy and politics, their promise, and their performance. In the vacuum of national policies 
to mitigate and adapt to climate-change, subnational arrangements offer an ideal opportunity to study 
not only the spontaneity of polycentrism, but whether or not it is leading to better environmental 
outcomes. This paper integrates polycentric theory and the environmental performance dilemma within 
the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework to guide the analysis of the multilevel 
comparative policy setting of U.S. environmental federalism. State and local government initiatives, or 
lack thereof, on climate change offer a quasi-experimental setting to examine the detailed decision-
making and the role of information within polycentric governance arrangements. This paper adapts 
Ostrom’s IAD framework for this task and presents hypotheses to explore: (1) institutional diversity; (2) 
multilevel institutional nesting; (3) analytic deliberation; and their relation to (4) Greenhouse Gas 
Emission (GHG) reduction performance. The research design developed in this paper advances theory 
development and environmental policy analysis with the IAD framework to clarify key conceptual and 
methodological issues that enables the investigation and diagnosis of the institutions and interactions 
driving U.S. climate risk governance with both large and small-N studies. 
Polycentric Climate Risk Governance 
Global climate change and its risks pose significant governance dilemmas. Greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions are changing the planet’s climate and, if ignored, will cost the U.S. economy hundreds of 
billions of dollars annually (Jorgenson et al. 2004; Sussman et al. 2013), increase morbidity and mortality 
rates (Barreca 2012; Tagaris et al. 2009), and pose multiple threats to the national security of the United 
States (Smith 2011; U.S. Department of Defense 2010). Conventional wisdom holds that a problem of 
this magnitude - a global scale problem - must be addressed by a coordinated international response 
(Aldy and Stavins 2009; Biermann et al. 2010; Victor 2011), but such an approach remains elusive. 
Instead, within the United States, subnational governments have been considerably more active in 
developing climate change mitigations and adaptations compared to their federal counterparts (Betsill 
2001; Rabe 2004, 2008, 2010, 2011; Sharp, Daley and Lynch 2011). Many states and localities are 




political boundaries. Conventional logic holds that the combination of concentrated costs and spillover 
benefits creates a considerable hurdle that should impede subnational policy making. Yet, several state 
and local governments have opted to pursue climate mitigation and adaptation policies.   
Scholars have examined this trend to better understand the determinants of policy adoptions under 
these circumstances (for example, see Krause 2011, 2012; Lutsey and Sperling 2008; Rabe 2004; 2007; 
2010; and Sharp, Daley and Lynch 2011). But far less attention has been directed to comprehensively 
examining the nature of these governance arrangements and how their variation may predict GHG 
emission reduction performance across the states. In large part, this shortcoming stems from data 
restrictions; there has been no feasible approach to systematically examine the ways in which state and 
local governance arrangements influence actual GHG emissions. The proposed research framework 
capitalizes on a new nationwide GHG emissions reporting program. Additionally, by explicitly 
considering environmental outcomes, this framework clarifies theories frequently used to understand 
environmental decision-making. 
In 2009, the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) announced the first facility level regulatory 
program addressing climate change when it issued the Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases 
(GHGs) rule. Facilities surpassing an emissions threshold of 25,000 metric tons are now required to 
annually estimate and report their GHG volume to the EPA. Prior to collecting this facility level 
information, since 1990, the EPA has estimated GHG emissions on a national and, to some extent 
sectoral level, in the Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks. But this was a top down 
approach and a coarse resolution of data that provided limited information for domestic policy making. 
While the Energy Information Administration (EIA) has tracked energy related facility CO2 emissions 
since 1990, EPA’s newly created emission inventory provides a comprehensive bottom up, facility level 




multilevel governance arrangements translate into effective climate risk governance performance. 
Facility level data for 2010, 2011 and 2012 are available with the 2013 dataset to be released in October 
2014.  
Research Objectives 
This research framework responds to Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern’s (2003) call for systematic research 
on multi-scale environmental resource governance and climate governance in particular (Arvai et al. 
2006; Ostrom 2009a, 2010). Our climate risk governance framework contributes to a more fully 
conceptualized theory of polycentricity1 within the Institutional Analysis and Development framework 
and proposes to test the implications of this merging in a multilevel comparative state setting. Future 
research based on this framework will systematically examine what types of institutional arrangements 
lend themselves to effective climate risk governance performance in a complex and fragmented political 
system. Research to date has largely focused on exploring the occurrence of multilevel policy activity for 
climate change mitigation (Amundsen et al. 2010; Betsill and Bulkeley 2006; Betsill and Rabe 2009; 
Corfee-Morlot et al. 2011; Dilling 2007; Rabe 2007, 2008) or adaptation (Adger, Arnell, and Tompkins 
2005; Hunt and Watkiss 2011; Mazmanian, Jurewitz, and Nelson 2013), as opposed to examining the 
consequences of that policy activity - actual changes in environmental performance by GHG emitters.  
Moreover, meaningfully incorporating environmental outcomes remains a central challenge in 
environmental policy research and must be tackled to allow for clearer tests of our theoretical 
expectations (Koontz and Thomas 2006; Niles and Lubell 2012; Ostrom 2007a, 2009c). State and local 
government initiatives on climate change, or lack thereof, offer a natural experiment to examine the 
                                                          
1 Polycentricity can be understood as a “system of governance in which authorities from overlapping 
jurisdictions (or centers of authority) interact to determine the conditions under which these 
authorities, as well as the citizens subject to these jurisdictional units, are authorized to act as well as 




detailed decision-making that occurs within polycentric governance arrangements. Some state and local 
governments have been active in climate governance - developing a range of mitigation and adaptation 
initiatives - for over a decade, providing an opportunity to test established theories predicting the 
performance of environmental resource protection using quantitative and qualitative evidence, and in 
doing so, expand our understanding of climate risk governance to better inform GHG reduction 
strategies.  
Our climate risk governance research program has three main objectives: 
1. To advance theory development and policy analysis with the Institutional Analysis and 
Development (IAD) framework and better understand how polycentricity -- through nesting, 
institutional diversity and analytic deliberation -- affects climate risk governance performance. 
This investigation will empirically test how state-level variations in polycentricity correlate with 
climate governance performance in reducing facility-level GHG emissions while controlling for 
other factors. 
2. To qualitatively analyze state-level institutional arrangements, policy community attributes, and 
action situations in order to better understand the micro-processes that link polycentric 
governance factors with climate risk governance and performance. Research based on the 
climate risk governance framework will utilize institutional environmental policy analysis to 
better understand the specific processes of cooperation, conflict, and deliberation in a nested 
and fragmented political system.    
3. To contribute to a productive dialogue on climate risk governance approaches among policy 
leaders, practitioners and students in the environmental field.  
Climate Risk Governance and the IAD Framework 
Climate change represents one of the most challenging commons dilemmas facing governments, 
markets, and communities. Because of the broad uncertainties underlying climate change, this research 
framework also situates this issue within the field of risk decision-making (Corfee-Morlot et al. 2011; De 
Marchi 2003; Deere and Birkbeck 2009; Klinke and Renn 2012; Renn 2008, 2011) and as an important 
topic for risk research (Keeney and McDaniels 2001; Lorenzoni et al. 2005; Pidgeon and Butler 2009). 
Moreover, climate risk governance, as Ostrom (2009a) observed, is “potentially the largest [collective 




for national and international collective action problems are informed by this famous characterization: 
“Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all” (Hardin 1968, 1244).  
A rich body of work challenges the rational-choice presumption that actors faced with an 
environmental dilemma will always succumb to the commons tragedy. In particular, as developed 
mainly by Elinor Ostrom (1986, 1990, 2007b, 2009b, 2010a), most researchers have used the 
Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework to study the resolution of localized natural 
resource conservation dilemmas around the world (Basurto 2013; Becker and Ostrom 1995, Benjamin et 
al. 1994; Bollman and Hardy 2012; Imperial 1999; Imperial and Yandle 2005; Joshi et al. 2000; Lam 1998; 
Lubell et al. 2002; McGinley and Cubbage 2011; Ostrom et. al 1994; Schlager 2002; Tang 1992; Tucker 
2008). Numerous scholars have called for widening the application of IAD and its Institutional Rational 
Choice (IRC) theory (Blomquist and de Leon 2011). According to Schlager and Blomquist (1996), 
applications of the IRC framework “. . . fail to account for institutional complexity created by 
constitutional-level arrangements such as separation of powers and federalism. . .” (667). Likewise, 
Lubell et al. (2010) noted the limited attention of the IRC to “. . . the existence of multiple institutions in 
a policy arena” (287). Most recently, Rosenbaum (2012) concluded that a remaining challenge for the 
IAD framework is its relevance for explaining “. . . governance models for management of much larger, 
globally pervasive common resources. . .” such as the earth’s climate (148). State-level climate risk 
governance in the U.S. offers an ideal context for answering these research challenges. 
A behavioral (Ostrom 1991, 1998), or institutional rational choice theory (Ostrom 2007b; Sabatier 
1991) lies at the heart of the IAD framework where individual choices are not tragedies occurring in 
vacuums, but within action situations (interactions and outcomes, see Ostrom 2007a, 2009c) shaped by 
human designed and nested arrangements of multilevel institutions. These decision situations are also 




Individual decision makers in an action situation are surrounded by four contexts that influence their 
choices: (1) the biophysical world; (2) a community the individual is embedded in; (3) sets of institutional 
rules that incentivize or constrain certain actions; and (4) group interactions (Koontz 2005; Ostrom 
2011.). 
 
Note: Dotted arrows represent where we will be able to use qualitative data and methods.  Solid arrows 
represent where we will be able to use quantitative data and methods. 
 
Following the logic of the IAD framework, this proposed research program will investigate the 
relationships between a group of exogenous variables (climate change vulnerability, the policy 
community’s attributes, and state-level polycentric institutional arrangements), state policy action 












Figure 1. State climate policy action situations. 




interrelationships will be examined with both qualitative and quantitative data and methods 
represented by dotted and solid arrows respectively in Figure 1. 
Climate Change Vulnerability 
Research in the IAD framework has traditionally focused on biophysical conditions of common pool 
resource systems commensurate in size to a localized community and several conditions amenable to 
successful management. As one researcher summarized: (1) the resource’s spatial extent should be 
small enough for users or appropriators to comprehend the boundaries; (2) the resource’s ecological 
dynamics should be relatively predictable; (3) there are good indicators of the resource’s conditions; and 
(4) the resource can feasibly be improved (Schlager 2004, 152). None of these conditions are met in the 
climate resource case. However, a review of the commons research field identified an important role for 
contingencies or moderator variables. “These are factors that are out of the practical control of short-
run policy interventions but that may determine how an intervention affects an outcome” according to 
Stern et al. (2002, 453). Measures of climate change risk (Brody et al. 2008; Zahran et al. 2008) and 
social vulnerability to environmental hazards (Cutter 1996; Morrow 1999) represent these kinds of 
factors. A state-level index of climate vulnerability will be developed that builds on climate risk and the 
county level Social Vulnerability Index (SOVI; see Cutter, Boruff, and Shirley 2003) leading to the first 
hypothesis. Climate vulnerability is expected to shape the context within which a state’s policy and 
institutional interventions develop and in turn, influence GHG reduction performance. 
State Climate Policy Community Attributes  
Within the IAD framework, the second exogenous variable represents a set of attributes for a 
community where actors are located. The relevant attributes are levels of trust among members, 
reciprocity, cooperation, shared values and goals, social capital, and repertoires of deliberative 




who have experienced a history of cooperation in various resource management settings (Beierle and 
Konisky 2005; Leach and Sabatier 2005; Lubell et al. 2002; Weber 1998); also sometimes referred to as a 
policy community (Dowding 1995; Jordan 1990; Lubell 2004; Marsh and Rhodes 1992; Schneider et al. 
2003; Scholz, Berardo, and Kile 2008). For instance, “rules, norms, and shared strategies are constituted 
and reconstituted by human interaction in frequently occurring or repetitive situations” (Crawford and 
Ostrom 1995, 582). In experimental settings, researchers have found that positive interactions in 
collective action simulations result in players learning to trust one another and tend to be reinforcing 
(Lubell and Scholz 2001; Ostrom 2000). In the adaptation of the IAD framework in the figure above, a 
double-arrow depicts this interaction between the policy community’s attributes and action situations 
and produces our second hypothesis. Some types of action situations generate and sustain trust, 
cooperation and shared goals among climate policy community stakeholders, and in turn, influence GHG 
reduction performance.  
Polycentric Institutions 
The IAD framework grew in part from the Ostroms’ research on polycentrism (V. Ostrom, Tiebout, 
and Warren 1961; McGinnis 1999; Ostrom 2010a, 2010b, 2012); a concept exemplified by American 
federalism. Consistent evidence highlighted the surprising finding that distributed and interdependent 
(nested) decision making centers in municipal settings were related to more efficient public service 
provisions. And while notions of polycentrism remain important in IAD applications, more recent 
research has focused on localized common pool resources and a series of eight institutional design 
principles associated with successful governance. Three of those principles are especially applicable at 
larger ecological scales where nonlocal forces are influential (Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern 2003).  
First, governance should involve the distribution of authority at multiple levels. Very few 




institutional arrangements, as both an investigative topic and as a variable. American climate risk 
governance has emerged at both the substate and regional level. On the former, a growing literature 
examines city-level climate initiatives (Betsill 2001; Brody et al. 2008; Krause 2011, 2012a, 2012b; Sharp, 
Daley, and Lynch 2011; Tang et al. 2010; Zahran et al. 2008) that can inform the construction of a state-
level index of localities pursuing GHG reduction efforts. Likewise, researchers have also explored the use 
of interstate climate compacts in the US (Engel 2006; Selin and VanDeveer 2011) which offer another 
component of polycentric climate risk governance. The project’s third and fourth hypotheses address 
these vertical and horizontal arrangements. Better GHG emission reduction performance is expected in 
states where a greater proportion of local governments are involved in climate protection programs. 
Likewise, better GHG emission reduction performance is expected in states participating in inter-state 
climate compacts. 
Second, as Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern (2003) and McGinnis (2011a) observed, polycentric governance 
is characterized by not just multi-level units (local, provincial, regional), but also: (1) multi-type units 
(markets, hierarchies, community self-governance), (2) multi-sector activities (built environment, 
energy, transportation), and (3) multi-functional rule structures (regulation, incentives, monitoring, 
sanctioning, and dispute resolution). For instance, mitigation strategies are now joined by adaptation 
policies as several states commit to a more diverse portfolio of climate change policy tools.  A rich 
source of institutional diversity data became available in 2011 with the Center for Climate and Energy 
Solutions (C2ES) publication of an inventory of state actions by sector (energy, transportation, and 
building), function, and type (emission standards and caps, reporting, financial incentives, etc.) totaling 
more than 30 categories and informs a fifth hypothesis. Better GHG reduction performance is expected 




However, beyond the hypothesis testing specified above, we also believe that more should be done 
for the theoretical understanding of polycentricity.  Concepts related to polycentricity need to be 
expanded to better acknowledge that state and local governments have both a hierarchical and 
networked relationship. We attempt some work in this area below. 
State climate policy action situations 
Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern (2003) use the concept of “analytic deliberation” to describe the third 
scalable design principle that defines one kind of outcome in an action situation. It has been described 
as “. . . the social space where individuals with diverse preferences interact, exchange goods and 
services, solve problems, dominate one another, or fight” (Ostrom 2009b, 14). The more recent 
conceptualizations of the action situation consisting of interactions and outcomes inform this proposed 
project (Ostrom 2007a, 2009). A critical outcome for nonlocal environmental governance dilemmas is a 
“well-structured dialogue involving scientists, resource users, and interested publics, and informed by 
analysis of key information about environmental and human-environment systems. . .” (Dietz, Ostrom, 
and Stern 2003, 1910). However, national US environmental policy and attempts to address climate 
change within this system rarely have been described as analytic or deliberative. Adversarial legalism 
(Kagan 1991, 1998) is the more common characterization as the dominant action situation is often 
described as “heavily bureaucratic, prescriptive, fragmented in purpose, and adversarial in nature” 
(Durant, Fiorino, and O’Leary 2004, 1). U.S. environmental policy’s gridlocked action “. . . has channeled 
tremendous political energies down other policymaking pathways, creating considerable instability in 
policy as policymakers and interest groups have pursued their agendas—sometimes momentous policy 
shifts—in other venues” (Klyza and Sousa 2013, 10). The states are one of those venues or, an 
alternative action situation that climate change programs have been channeled through in the historical 




hypothesis. Better GHG reduction performance is therefore expected in states where actors have 
developed action situations that foster analytic deliberation.  
Polycentricity and U.S. State Actors 
Recently, polycentricity has received new attention from scholars. Our integration of these different 
strands of theory and empirical work are what drive some new theorizing about the interactions of U.S. 
state actors with local actors.   First, some of Elinor Ostrom’s contributions of the last decade (Ostrom 
2009a; Dietz, Ostrom, Stern 2003), before her death, have included linkages between polycentricity and 
climate governance.  She saw a role for theory related to polycentricity in wider climate change policy 
research.  Second, in an in-depth analysis of polycentricity, Aligica and Tarko (2012) pointed out some 
critical questions left unanswered about the relationship between polycentricity and monocentricy.  The 
two are not divorced from each other in many cases.  Finally, others have noticed overlap in theorizing 
between work on polycentricity, network theory, and collaborative public management (Rogers 2014). 
Our integration of these ideas suggests to us a need to further articulate the complex interactions 
between different actors within, and between, action situations.   
Though polycentricity is at the center of our understanding of the IAD framework, scholars who use 
the framework acknowledge that polycentric systems can have monocentric “elements” within them 
(Ostrom 1972 in McGinnis 1999, 52).  We would go a step farther and say that within polycentric 
systems there can be interactions between levels in the system that are hierarchical and therefore can 
be characterized as monocentric interactions.  Our particular focus here is the multi-level relationship 
between local governments and the state government within which those localities are found – the 




in horizontal and collaborative ways AND relate to each other in vertical ways (both coercive and non-
coercive).2  
Local policy actors and state actors can be understood, under certain circumstances, to be 
participating in the same action situation (see Figure 1 above).  At other times state actors can be 
understood as “rule enforcers” (Aligica and Tarko 2012, 256) or capacity builders (Corfee-Morlot et al 
2011, 179) – outsiders whose actions arise from collective choices at the state level (or at the national 
level).  The collective choice sits outside an action situation where an operational choice plays out 
(McGinnis 2011).  As Aligica and Tarko state, “In a polycentric system, one may be an outsider to a unit 
but insider to another and thus, ultimately, part of the overarching system” (255).  In effect this means 
that state actors can be understood to act at two levels of nested institutional arrangements. They can 
join a variety of sub-state actors (e.g., general purpose local governments, special districts, non-
governmental organizations) within one level of a polycentric system while also acting at another higher 
level in a different capacity.3   
State Actors in their Horizontal Capacity 
The idea of state actors acting alongside a number of local actors in a metropolitan region goes back 
to the theoretical beginnings of the use of polycentricity in a governance context (Ostrom et al. 1961).  
In response to a standard argument of the time that metropolitan regions were chaotic and inefficient 
because of the numerous governmental units (including state agencies), Ostrom and Ostrom (1965) 
argued that such separate (but overlapping) units might be the best choice under certain conditions.  
These numerous governmental units, each with their own jurisdiction, and therefore distinct center of 
                                                          
2
 The arguments made below are assumed to apply across purpose, sector, and function. 
3
 To be clear, a specific participant in a particular position within an action situation is not necessarily going to 
be the same participant in a particular position at another level of the system.  But both of these participants may 





power, can be understood as a coherent system.  Rather than a hierarchical structure (monocentricity), 
such a system could perform the same public functions but do so in a way where power is shared in a 
horizontal form (polycentricity). 
This idea of horizontal interactions can be found in scholarly literatures beyond the institutional 
choice literature.  For example, in public management this idea of polycentricity is akin to ideas of 
collaborative public management (Agranoff and McGuire 2004).  Collaborative public management 
involves both governmental units and non-governmental actors in the provision of public services.  
Rather than focusing on hierarchy, the desire is to study and better understand the “transactions 
between formal entities” (Agranoff and McGuire 2004, vii). 
From policy theory come ideas such as policy networks and partnerships that reflect the mutuality 
of decision-making authority for both collective and operational choices (Bevir 2008; Klijn and 
Koppenjan 2000).  Policy networks are understood to be horizontal interactions, with each node having 
the potential to be connected to every other node in a non-hierarchical form.  Partnerships, by very 
definition, are understood to involve two or more autonomous actors who have the authority to join 
with others on a common project. 
Our sense of the two basic types of horizontal collaborative interactions includes the following:       
(1) State and local actors are involved together in both collective choices AND operational choices, and 
(2) State and local actors are involved together in operational choices where the collective choice has 
come from above. 
State Actors in their Vertical Coercive Capacity  
In key respects the idea of state actors relating to local governments in a hierarchical form is a 
conceptual default for intergovernmental relations in the late 20th century.  As Agranoff (2001) argues, 




specifying what must be done at the state and local level. States too used a stronger regulatory hand in 
this period.  To be clear the idea of monocentric control as described here is relative.  We are not talking 
about a unitary state.  But neither are we talking about the decentered decision-making of polycentricity 
as it could occur for both collective and operational choices.  Rather, we are talking about federalism on 
a continuum from coercive to cooperative to collaborative (Agranoff 2001). 
Our sense of the two basic types of vertical coercive interactions includes the following: (1) State 
actors set up regulations but allow significant discretion at the local level, ensuring local autonomy in 
the means of implementation, and (2)  State actors use strong regulatory language and limit significantly 
the discretion of local actors to make operational choices. 
State Actors in their Vertical Non-Coercive Capacity 
Key to the idea of a vertical, non-coercive interaction is that states sometimes work with localities 
on issues where the state doesn’t regulate local governmental behavior but instead acts to incentivize or 
subsidize local actions.  In such cases state actors neither act as regulators nor as collaborators, but 
rather they work as facilitators and capacity builders. 
This idea of a vertical, non-coercive interaction has been studied in multiple areas of public policy 
(including educational, energy, and public health), though its fullest articulation has been in the area of 
environmental policy (Andrews 1999; Durant et al 2004; Kraft et al 2011).  A variety of non-regulatory 
programs, including market-based incentives, voluntary programs, information disclosure programs, and 
technical assistance programs, are meant to spur local governments to do more than they already are 
doing. Such programs may be created by state legislatures or from within state agencies. 
Our sense of the one basic type of vertical non-coercive interaction includes the following: (1) State 
actors make collective choices and send them down to the local level, allowing complete discretion at 




These different conceptions of the interactions between state and local actors will inform our 
analyses of both our quantitative and quality data. 
Research Methods 
To better understand the complex relationship between multi-level governance and 
environmental performance, the project will rely upon small N case study research and large N statistical 
modeling including a web-based survey of key stakeholders.  There are no methodological “panaceas” 
for the institutional analysis of actors and context (Basurto and Ostrom 2009; Poteete, Janssen, and 
Ostrom 2010; Stern et al. 2002) therefore, We will utilize multiple methods. This multi-method approach 
is appropriate because the research problem is complex, longitudinal, and multilevel. A growing 
literature on integrating qualitative and quantitative methods guides the project’s hybrid research 
design (Brady and Collier 2010; Coppedge 1999; King, Keohane, and Verba 1994; Lieberman 2005; 
McGinnis 2000; Ragin 1987; Tarrow 1995). Specifically, the project employs a nested mixed method 
comparative analysis (Coppedge 2001; Lieberman 2005; Seawright 2010a) combining qualitative and 
quantitative data collection and analysis techniques.  Included here are just some of the details about 
our qualitative and quantitative methods.  Further details are available upon request. 
Qualitative Data Collection 
We will use a Small-N case study methodology and collect data in the first and third years of the 
research timeline. In the first year, initial case study work will continue a three-state convenience 
sample (Kansas, Washington State, and Oregon) already being developed. In the third year, three 
additional cases will be selected consistent with a “Model-testing Small-N Analysis” (Mt-SNA) or a 
“Model-building Small-N Analysis” (Mb-SNA) informed by variations in our quantitative analysis 
(Lieberman 2005, 444-448). Six different kinds of qualitative evidence lead to six different collection 




documentation, and archival records. First, we anticipate conducting 15 to 20 semi-structured in person 
interviews per case. ECOS regional representatives and key policy elites identified with snowball 
sampling and in newspaper articles and organizational websites will compose the sample of respondents 
for case study interviews. Policy and political documentation will be obtained from climate plans 
collected from the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI) database of local 
climate action, C2Es’ database of local adaptation plans, state climate policy program archives or 
officials, Georgetown Climate Center’s “Adaptation Clearinghouse,” organizational websites, state 
legislative databases, and the National Conference of State Legislatures’ (NCSL) Bill Information Service.  
The relevant case studies will have two levels of analysis corresponding with two separate units 
of analysis (Poteete, Janssen and Ostrom 2010). First, comparative case studies will be structured 
around state policy jurisdictions as a unit of analysis. Oregon and Washington offer well developed 
climate risk governance cases while Kansas is relatively underdeveloped. The initial case studies will also 
help construct the sampling frame for the three additional state case studies and within-case data 
sources. Quantitative research in year 1 and 2 will help identify a well developed state case, an 
underdeveloped case, and a “deviant” case in year three (Lieberman 2005). Second, within-case analysis 
across the six states involves a social group unit of analysis, or the groups engaged with the climate 
policy action situation in a state and their institutional statements. These units of analysis are the most 
relevant for diagnosing collective action prospects (see Poteete et al. 2010, 66-67). For within-case 
analysis, we will rely on a minimum of 30 observations (20 interviews and 10 documents for example) 
resulting in a minimum of 180 observations across the six case studies.  
Qualitative Analysis 
The comparative case analysis in the first year will inform the conceptualization and 
operationalization (indexes and scales) of variables for subsequent quantitative work. Conversely, within 




between policy community attributes, institutional arrangements, and action situations. Moreover, 
Causal Process Observations (CPOs) will inform the diagnosis of Data Process Observations (DPOs) from 
the quantitative analysis (see Brady, Collier, and Seawright 2010b). The qualitative analysis will also 
illuminate important theoretical anomalies that can advance the field of governance studies. 
Comparisons of multiple cases allow for a more refined understanding of micro-processes within 
different institutional settings that complements the quantitative methods (Brady and Collier 2010; 
Koontz 2005; Poteete, Janssen, and Ostrom 2010).  
In particular, the interactions and outcomes of state climate policy action situations will be the 
focus of qualitative analysis. First, we will use the Institutional Grammar Tool (Crawford and Ostrom 
1995) and its recent variants (Basurto et al. 2010; Crawford and Ostrom 2005; Siddiki et al. 2011) to 
code within-case conditions that may lead to deliberative and cooperative outcomes instead of conflict 
and mistrust. This will involve coding interview responses and individual climate action plans or other 
relevant institutional statements (statues, executive orders, agency strategies) as written rules with the 
following grammatical components: (1) the attribute or subject of the rule; (2) the deontic or 
prescription type; (3) the aim or prescribed action; (4) the conditions on how the rule must be followed; 
and (5) an “or else” consequence. Three types of institutional statements observable in climate action 
situations are: strategies, obligations, and rules (Crawford and Ostrom 1995, 2005).  For instance, shared 
strategies in a policy statement would include only Attributes, aIms, and Conditions (AIC) while climate 
plans establishing obligations or a norm would also include a Deonitc (ADIC) signaled with statements 
that connotate what is obliged, permitted, or forbidden. Finally, “Or else” phrasings signal a more 
traditional command and control kind of rule (ADICO). Our goal for intercoder reliability is 80 percent 
agreement levels (see Basurto et al. 2010).  
The IGT analysis builds the empirical foundation for examining two “pragmatic” issues according 




institutional statements in the action situation of interest. Second, the effects of institutional statement 
configurations can be examined. In this project, we will organize and examine the institutional 
configurations in relation to the analytic deliberation exhibited in different state climate action 
situations. Such analysis will employ Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA); a middle pathway between 
qualitative and statistical analysis (Ragin 2008). Fuzzy Set QCA relies on set theory and Boolean algebra 
to systematize qualitative comparisons. Moreover, QCA is well suited for small to intermediate samples 
sizes (N = 5-65, see Ragin 1987, 2000).  
QCA questions are usually framed as “under what conditions” instead of “by how much” 
allowing us to examine configurations of causal conditions and outcomes. For instance, biophysical 
conditions, community attributes, and institutional arrangements are expected to be related to analytic 
deliberation. Moreover, analytic deliberation conditions are expected to be related to state-level GHG 
reduction performance. Different climate plan configurations will be operationalized as a degree of 
membership falling between 0 and 1 in a category’s full set (Ragin 2008) and the calibration of our 
qualitative variables will follow the six steps outlined by Basurto and Speer (2012). We will utilize the 
fuzzy extension to STATA (Longset and Vaisey 2008) for the qualitative data analysis.   
Quantitative Data Collection 
We plan to collect and merge an array of secondary data to better understand how climate risk 
governance with a particular focus on state level analytical deliberation, nested institutional 
arrangements, and institutional diversity affects GHG reduction performance. We will utilize EPA’s 
GHGRP to develop measures of GHG reduction performance. Currently, there are three years of facility 
level emissions data available from the GHGRP (2010-2012). Two more years of emissions data will 
become available over the course of the proposed research project. This reporting program includes 
nine reporting sectors: Power Plants; Refineries; Chemical Manufacturing; Other Industrial; Landfills; 




available emissions data from EPA’s GHGRP. For facilities that have been reporting since 2010 we will 
create a panel dataset and develop absolute and relative measures of change in emissions over time, 
using both as a dependent variable. We will use this data to test the effects of climate risk governance 
on both overall emission changes in a facility and emission changes normalized per unit production.  
Whenever possible, the researchers will generate emission changes per unit produced in facilities.  
Currently, this is only possible for the power sector by merging production data from EPA’s Clean Air 
Markets dataset.  
The structure of the GHGRP data allows us to build a unique clustered data set and use it to 
statistically estimate how both facility and state level characteristics affect change in emissions over our 
three to five year time period. Systematically comparing emission profiles of similar facilities that 
operate in different state environments is particularly important given the wide range of climate risk 
governance across states. Each facility in the database contains several geographic identifiers (e.g., 
state, city, county, zip code and full mailing address). We will merge a range of state, local and even 
facility characteristics to each facility in the GHGRP. In addition, we will conduct a web-based survey of 
state government personnel and key stakeholders to determine how trust, cooperation and shared 
goals influence GHG emission reduction performance. Table 1 highlights the variables needed for the 
quantitative analysis. Secondary data collection effort is currently underway with several variables 
already collected and merged into a panel dataset where the unit of analysis is “facility_state_year” with 
more than 3,000 observations per year. We will rely on information from the Center for Climate and 
Energy Solutions (C2ES; formerly the Pew Center on Global Climate Change), ICLEI, ESRI’s Business 
Analyst, and other secondary data sources to better understand what elements of climate risk 






Table 1 - Variable Description  
Concept of Interest Operationalization Source 
GHG Emission Reduction Performance 
 Change in GHG Emission by facility (both absolute and 
percentage change). Emissions data are available at the 
facility level over three years. 
EPA GHGRP* 
 Per unit change in GHG emissions in Power Sector. This 
information is not publicly available for the other sectors of 
the GHGRP.   
EPA GHGRP* and     
Clean Air Markets 
Climate Change Vulnerability 
- Biophysical 
Vulnerability 
Hazard causalities measured as the sum of deaths and injuries 
from weather related extreme events for the last decade.  
Spatial Hazards  
Events & Losses  
Database for the  
U.S. (1960-2012)* 
 
 Percentage of Coastal Areas at or below sea level.  NOAA, Sea Level  
Rise and Coastal  
Flooding.  
 
- Social Vulnerability Social Vulnerability Index to Environmental Hazards (2006-
2010). 
Hazards and  
Vulnerability   
Research Instit. * 
State Policy Community Attributes 
- Trust, Cooperation, 
& Shared Goals  
State decision makers and key stakeholders’ 
perceptions/evaluations of trust, cooperation, and shared goals 




Polycentric Institutions: Nested Arrangements 
- Vertical Nesting  Multiple measures of vertical nesting will be constructed.  (1) 
The proportion of local governments within a state that have 
developed climate adaptation plans.  (2) Proportion of local 
governments who have joined ICLEI’s climate protection 
initiative and or climate resilient communities; and (3) The 
proportion of U.S. Conference of Mayor Climate Protection 
Agreement signatories within a state. 
C2ES*, ICLEI  
USA & US  
Conference of  
Mayors & Census  
of Government* 
 
- Horizontal Nesting  
 
Inter-state nesting will be measured by constructing a variable 





Polycentric Institutions: Diverse Arrangements 
- Institutional 
Diversity 
Three different variables will be created based on C2ES’ 
classification of climate related policy activity within states 
(and cross-checked using information in Georgetown’s 
Climate Center): (1) an index score noting the diversity of 
approaches used in decision making venues  (markets, 
hierarchies, self governance); (2) a variable measuring the 
number of climate policy activities across multiple sectors; 
and (3) a count of the number of policy tools such as 
regulations, incentives, and dispute resolution, used across 
sectors.   
C2ES* &  
Georgetown  
Climate Center: A  
Leading Resource  






State Climate Policy Action Situations 
 - Analytical 
Deliberation  
At least four variables will represent analytical deliberation.  
(1) A binary variable indicating if state has a climate change 
commission or advisory board.  (2) Code the diversity of the 
advisory board’s membership.  (3) Categorize each the level 
of activity of each advisory board.  (4) And evaluate state 
involvement in NA2050.  
 
C2ES* 
Controls   
- Facility Level  Employees Per facility 
 
ESRI’s Business  
Analyst 
 Environmental Compliance includes a variable noting if the 
facility has been in “Significant Non-Compliance” with the 
Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act or the Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act prior to reporting of GHG emissions.  
EPA’s ECHO  
Database** 
  




- State level Experience – the length of time a state has been engaged 
in climate governance.  
C2ES*  
* = This information has been collected. 
** = This information has been collected and merged with the GHGRP data.  
 
Climate Change Vulnerability. To better understand how climate change vulnerability shapes GHG 
emission reduction performance we will develop two measures of vulnerability: biophysical and social. 
Using previous research as a guide (Brody et al. 2008; Zahran et al. 2008), we will include a state level 
variable reporting the cumulative number of deaths and injuries from extreme weather related in the 
decade prior to the GHG emissions data. A second biophysical variable noting the percentage of coastal 
areas within a state that are at or below sea level will also be included. Recent scholarship highlights 
that social vulnerability to climate change is critically important in understanding and measuring climate 
vulnerability (Altizer et al. 2013; Lafferty 2009; and Cutter et al. 2008). Therefore, we will also create a 
state level social vulnerability index patterned off the current county level measure publically available 
from the Hazards and Vulnerability Research Institute.   
Attributes of State Climate Policy Community. Across the fifty states, the policy community 




within any policy community, the level of trust among actors, cooperation and shared goals are critical 
in shaping behavior. Because this type of information is not readily available in existing secondary data 
sets, we propose a web-based survey of state environmental agency personnel and elected officials 
active on environmental policy legislative committees. This survey will also be distributed to key 
stakeholders from the for-profit and nonprofit sectors. Data from the survey will be aggregated to 
measure overall levels of trust within the climate policy community and also provide an indication of the 
extent of cooperation and shared goals about climate change and appropriate public actions in response 
to climate change.  
Several sources will be used to develop a sampling frame for the web-based survey. Information on 
state civil servants and elected officials is publically available. Moreover, the collaborative relationship 
with the Environmental Council of State Governments (ECOS) will be invaluable to ensure adequate 
contact information. This survey will also be distributed to key stakeholders representing a range of 
interests in climate governance. Relying upon the “Encyclopedia of Associations: National Organizations 
of the U.S” and “Encyclopedia of Associations: Regional, State and Local Organization” available through 
WWU’s library, we will develop a sampling frame that includes individuals representing non-profit 
organization that are linked to the nine sectors required to report under the GHGRP, such as the 
National Association of Manufacturers, or the Independent Petroleum Association of America. These 
two databases provide electronic contact information for individuals within organizations. In addition to 
surveying membership organizations directly connected to the nine sectors covered by the GHGRP, we 
will also use these databases to augment the sampling frame of key stakeholder by including 
representatives of chamber of commerce organizations and environmental advocacy groups. We will 
randomly sample 600 individuals from these stakeholders. Finally, to ensure that the web-based survey 
includes perspectives from the regulated community, we will include a stratified random sample of GHG 




petroleum and natural gas systems, and waste), we will use the most recent reporting year and divide 
facilities into small, medium, and large emitters. Once stratified, 75 facilities within each size range and 
sector will be randomly sampled for a total of 675 emitters.   
This approach will allow us to survey public and private decision-makers to determine how levels of 
trust, cooperation and shared goals influence GHG reduction performance. In previous research all three 
researchers have developed surveys for policy elites that focus on these issues (Daley 2009; Kraft, 
Stephan, and Abel 2011). In total, we anticipate surveying more than 1000 key stakeholders using this 
approach. The University of Kansas uses Qualtrics to develop and implement web-based surveys. We 
will rely upon a variant of the “Tailored Design Method” (Dillman, Smyth and Christian 2000) to guide 
survey development and implementation. Once the sample for the survey has been finalized, an email 
will be sent to all participants notifying them of their inclusion in the survey and highlighting the 
importance of their participation. Following this, the electronic survey will be administered, with weekly 
follow up prompts to non-respondents occurring weekly for up to four weeks. After the third reminder 
prompt, non-respondents will be contacted by phone in an effort to maximize the response rate.   
Polycentric Institutions: Nested Arrangements. This research design acknowledges that multiple and 
overlapping institutional designs exist in climate risk governance and our empirical approach will 
evaluate the impact of several forms of polycentrism. First, we have started to collect a range of data 
that indicate if a local government is activity pursuing climate mitigation or adaptation policies. 
Information on local government activity will come from several publicly available sources, including 
C2ES, ICLEI, and Georgetown Climate Center. Using this information, we will construct a variable noting 
the proportion of local governments within a state that are actively engaged in climate risk governance. 
The denominator for this measure, total number of local governments, is publically available via the 




collected by C2ES, we will develop a measure noting if the state participates in any regional climate 
initiatives.   
Polycentric Institutions: Diverse Arrangements. C2ES reports a range of state climate related 
activities.  Using this information and cross-checking it with state documents and other organizations 
that track state policy activity, such as the Georgetown Climate Center, We will create an index score 
noting the diversity of state approaches, along with measuring policy activity across multiple sectors.  
Finally, we will create a measure based on the range of policy tools used by state governments. This 
measure will capture creative financing programs, incentives and regulations for carbon capture and 
sequestration, and low carbon fuel standards among others.  We expect systematic emission reductions 
to occur in states that are engaged in a range of climate risk governance. An important aspect of 
measuring institutional diversity includes understanding or controlling for the length of time a state has 
been activity pursuing climate change policy. For those states with active climate change initiatives, we 
will rely upon C2ES data that highlights the passage of key policy initiatives to measure their experience 
in this area. This indicator of experience can be used to develop more detailed measures of the 
institutional diversity. Interacting institutional diversity with experience may provide a more valid 
operationalization of institutional diversity while also potentially highlighting critical mechanisms of 
climate risk governance.  
State Climate Policy Action Situations.  This research will measure the extent to which states have 
created alternative action situations that rely upon analytical deliberation to address the challenges 
associated with climate change. A range of research highlights the importance of collaborative forums 
and their role in improved decision-making. We have collected data from C2ES that provides 
considerable detail on the twenty-five states that have active legislative and executive climate advisory 




their membership to understand the range of sectors and stakeholders represented, and categorizing 
their activity in terms of meetings, document writing, and outreach. In states without active climate risk 
governance, we will examine state environmental agency websites and state documents such as 
legislative and executive reports and issue briefs, in order to determine if climate advisory panels have 
been formed or if there is an appropriate counterpart in these states. There is a distinct need for more 
systematic research that considers what forces shape both the promotion and opposition to climate 
governance (Selin and Vandeveer 2013). We also have collected data on which states are involved with 
North American 2050 (NA2050), a forum committed to identify the range of policies needed to move 
their states to a low-carbon economy. This information will be used as an additional indicator of an 
alternative action situation.  
Controls. Finally, because a range of factors influences GHG emissions, appropriate control variables 
will be included. Using a facility’s address, we will merge facility level information from ESRI’s Business 
Analyst database available through WWU’s library. This will allow a control for facility size by including 
variables like the number of employees in a facility. We have tested this merging approach on a small 
number of facilities to ensure its accuracy. Additionally, we have already merged facility-based 
information from EPA’s Enforcement and Compliance History Online database. This includes information 
on any regulated environmental emissions, along with a wide range of compliance and enforcement 
information. We will include a variable noting if a facility has been in “significant non-compliance” with 
major environmental legislation five years prior to reporting GHG emissions. With this secondary data 
assembled, we will be in a position to simultaneously examine the impact of state climate risk 





After collecting and merging the full range of secondary data described above, along with primary data 
collection using the web-based survey, we will rely upon multivariate statistical techniques that allow for 
the estimation of relationships while accounting for the clustered nature of the data. Doing so will 
enable the research team to understand how climate risk governance within states affect facility level 
GHG emissions. A panel data set will be constructed to analyze the relative effect of nested and diverse 
institutional arrangements and analytical deliberation on emissions, controlling for a range of other 
factors likely to influence emissions. We will utilize random effects multilevel modeling (MLM) using 
Stata. A dynamic higher-level model with nested random effects will capitalize on the data structure: 
clusters, nested within super clusters (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012). This will allow We to examine 
how both facility and state level factors predict change in emissions over time (Deleeuw and Kreft 1986; 
Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012). MLM is increasingly being used in social science research (Djupe and 
Olson 2010; Smith and Walker 2013; Raudenbush and Bryk 2002; Steenbergen and Jones 2002) to better 
understand how characteristics or variables grouped at different levels influence a range of outcomes. 
One of the challenges in using this methodological approach includes the need for clear theoretical 
expectations that correspond to the relevant levels of analysis (Blalock 1984; Diez-Roux 2000; Gamoran 
1992). In this respect the IAD and polycentric governance provide an excellent theoretical approach with 
clear expectations that apply to different analytical levels.  
 
We will model emission changes - both absolute and percentage change in emission - as a function 
facility level characteristics (number of employees, previous environmental performance) and climate 
risk governance factors (vertical and horizontal nesting within the state; measures of institutional 
diversity, and upon completion of the web based survey, assessment of trust, cooperation and shared 




within a state along with facility level controls for different GHGRP sectors. In the power sector, 
production data are available via EPA’s Clean Air Markets data.  Therefore, for this sector We will be in a 
position to estimate the same model described above on change in emission per unit production (or 
power generated for this sector.  The sub analysis for this important sector will allow the inclusion of 
additional policy context, such as incentives for renewable energy generation, that may influence 
environmental performance.  
A random effects MLM is appropriate for our data structure and allows us to evaluate the effect of 
both within and across level interactions. With MLM the sample or population size of the second level – 
state level in this case – is critical to consider when constructing models (Stegmueller 2013). While there 
is no consensus about how many observations are needed at the second level of analysis, it is generally 
desirable to sample thirty or more at the second level (Deleeuw and Kreft 1995; Hox and Kreft 1994) and 
some suggest that the second level of analysis needs more than fifty observations to guard against 
biased estimates (Maas and Hox 2005). Because there are three years of GHGRP data, we will be able to 
measure emission changes in all states over two time periods, using the first round of data to gauge 
absolute and relative emission changes. Therefore, there will be 100 observations at the second level of 
analysis. While all of We have significant empirical modeling experience, the research team will work 
closely with quantitative methodologists from the University of Kansas’ Center for Research Methods & 
Data Analysis (CRMDA) to ensure that our analytical approach is appropriate and the inferences drawn 
from our data are replicable.  
We will model GHG emission reduction performance using the full panel of facilities along with 
examining change from 2011-2012. There are approximately 3,000 facilities that have reported across all 
three years of the GHGRP. But EPA has also added source categories that increase the number of 
facilities that must now report under this program. The 2012 GHGRP data had more than 8000 facilities.  




measuring absolute and relative emission changes across one time period - to determine if the patterns 
hold when more emitters are included in the data. If the same patterns exist, we will have more 
confidence in the relationships that emerge. 
Causal inference is always a challenge in studies relying on observational data.  Whenever possible 
we will validate the statistical analysis using proxy indicators of environmental performance, thus 
limiting potential endogenity issues. State level action on climate change has been differential across 
space and time. While implementation scholars suggest this is a strength of the proposed research 
design because it generally takes at least a decade to see changes “on the ground” (Mazmanian and 
Sabatier 1989), we recognize that some GHG emission reductions could have occurred before the 
GHGRP. Therefore, as a robustness check, we will examine aggregate state level CO2 emissions from 
2000 – 2010 recently released by the US Energy Information Administration (EIA).  While this is a limited 
subsection of GHG emissions from energy related activities, it provides a reasonable proxy to examine 
emissions levels directly before and after a range of state policy activity.  As a follow up robustness 
check we will examine a second proxy indicator for GHG emission, per capita hazardous air pollutants 
(HAP). Prior research has relied in this as a proxy indicator for CO2 emission, noting that HAP emissions 
are highly correlated to estimated CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion (Brody et al. 2008). Time 
variant HAP data are available from the EPA and therefore will allow us to examine emission patterns 
before and after a range of climate policy activity across the states.  This type of follow-up analysis 
provides additional confidence in any results and can help support causal inferences. 
Conclusion 
The proposed research program offers the first systematic attention and evaluation of America’s 
subnational climate risk governance. More than a decade ago, the National Academy of Public 




policies. Likewise, an earlier NAPA (1995) study found that the EPA was failing to leverage the problem-
solving capacity of firms, cities, and states effectively. The results from this research will inform this 
ongoing debate both for climate risk and environmental governance more broadly.  
In diverse and complex institutional settings, thousands of industrial facilities and hundreds of 
subnational US governments are at the forefront of American climate risk governance. The research 
program proposed here offers a framework to examine whether and how subnational governance 
arrangements affect GHG emission trends. Informed by this climate risk governance framework, future 
empirical work will investigate the institutional factors, policy community attributes, and interactions 
that most significantly facilitate or impede subnational climate risk governance and performance. In the 
vacuum of national policies to mitigate and adapt to climate-change, subnational governance 
arrangements offer an ideal opportunity to study not only the spontaneity of polycentrism, but whether 
or not it is leading to better environmental outcomes. 
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